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Cooperative Product Games
David Rosales
Abstract
I introduce cooperative product games (CPGs), a cooperative game
where every player has a weight, and the value of a coalition is the product
of the weights of the players in the coalition. I only look at games where
the weights are at least 2.
I show that no player in such a game can be a dummy. I show that
the game is convex, and therefore always has a non-empty core. I provide
a simple method for finding a payoff vector in the core.
1 Introduction
Game theory deals with several players who make strategic choices, knowing that
the choices of others affect their own utility. It has implications in economics,
commerce, law and business.
Some aspects of interaction between players are cooperation and negotiation,
which are covered by cooperative game theory. When players are selfish, they
can only cooperate and make a stable coalition if they can find reasonable ways
to divide the gained utility. Cooperative game theory takes a model of such
an interaction, and uses solution concepts to characterize which distributions of
utility would be agreed on.
I use the framework of transferable utility cooperative games, where players
can form agreements about dividing the utility. I propose one simple model
of cooperation, where every player has a weight, which captures the factor by
which the utility of a coalition is multiplied when the player is added to that
coalition. Therefore, the value of a coalition of players who cooperate together is
the product of all these weights factors. I call these games Cooperative Product
Games.
I show that these games have a certain convexity property, which results
in these games always having a stable utility allocation, as captured by the
Core [61] solution concept. I present some basic concepts and notation in Sec-
tion 2, formally describe the game and the results in Section 3, describe related
work and models in Section 4 and give a conclusion in Section 5.
1
2 Basic Concepts and Notation
Transferable utility cooperative games are a tool for analyzing cooperation be-
tween players. They are defined using a characteristic function, which describes
the value for every subset of players. The important question cooperative game
theory asks is how the players will divide the value they make when they work
together.
Definition 1. A transferable utility cooperative game has a set P =
{a1, . . . , an} of players, characteristic function from any player subset to a value:
v : 2P → R. This function tells us how much utility any subset of the players
make when they work together.
Mostly researchers only look at games which are monotonic and super-
additive. A game is called monotonic if for any C′ ⊂ C ⊆ P we have that:
v(C′) ≤ v(C), and is called super-additive if for any disjoint coalitions A,B ⊂ P
we have v(A)+v(B) ≤ v(A∪B). If the game is super-additive it is always good
for two sub-coalitions to merge, because they make more utility overall, so in
the end we get the grand coalition of all the players.
We call a player a dummy if they never contribute anything to the value of
any coalition.
Definition 2. A dummy player is a player ai such that there does not exist
any coalition C such that v(C ∪ {ai})  v(C).
The characteristic function only tells us how much a coalition makes, but
not how they will divide it between the members of the coalition. An agreement
between the players about dividing the utility is expressed as an imputation.
Definition 3. An imputation (p1, . . . , pn) is a division of the utility of the
grand coalition between the players, i.e. pi ∈ R, such that
∑n
i=1 pi = v(I).
The payoff of player ai is pi. I use p(C) to denote the payoff of coalition C:
p(C) :=
∑
i∈{i|ai∈C}
pi.
2.1 The Core
There are many possible imputations in a game, so it is important to give tools
to decide which of them the players would choose to use to divide the utility.
Generally we expect that for any player ai ∈ C, we should have: pi ≥
v({ai}). If this does not happen, some player can get a better utility for himself
by separating from the rest of the players and working alone. The same reason-
ing is also true for coalitions. A coalition C stops (sometimes called “blocks”)
the imputation (p1, . . . , pn) if p(C) < v(C), because the members of C can de-
viate from the original coalition to get a utility v(C), which is more than they
are paid under the imputation.
The difference between a coalition’s value under the characteristic function,
and the total payment of the coalition under an imputation is called the excess
of that coalition in that imputation.
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Definition 4. Given an imputation p = (p1, . . . , pn), the excess of a coalition
C is e(C) = v(C) − p(C).
Definition 5. A coalition C stops the imputation p = (p1, . . . , pn) if its excess
under this imputation is strictly positive, e(C) > 0.
The main solution concept in cooperative game theory that is based on the
excess of coalitions is the core [61].
Definition 6. The core of a cooperative game is the set of all imputations
(p1, . . . , pn) that are not blocked by any coalition, so that for any coalition C,
we have p(C) ≥ v(C).
If there are imputations in the core of a game, we are interested in algorithms
that find such an imputation. However, for some games no such an imputation
exist, and we say the core of the game is empty. One condition that guarantees
that the core of a game is not empty is convexity.
Definition 7. A game is convex if for any A,B ⊆ P we have v(A ∪ B) ≥
v(A) + v(B) − v(A ∩B).
Earlier work showed that for convex games, the core is always non-empty [94,
64]. One way to find core imputations in convex games is to look at player
permutations.
We denote by pi a permutation of the players, and by Π the set of all possible
player permutations. We can now look at how much utility every player adds
in a permutation, which is the difference between the utility that all the players
before him in that permutation have, and the utility that they have including
him. Formally, given permutation pi ∈ Π = (ax1 , . . . , axn) (i.e. x1 is the index
of the first player in the permutation, x2 is the index of the second index in the
permutation and so on), the marginal contribution of player axi is defined as
follows. For ax1 , the first player in the permutation pi, we define the marginal
contribution in pi to be mpix1 = v({axi}). For any other player axi , we define the
marginal contribution of axi in pi to be:
mpixi = v({ax1 , ax2 , . . . , axi})− v({ax1 , ax2 , . . . , axi−1})
Weber [102] defined the marginal contribution vector given a permutation
pi = (ax1 , . . . , axn) as: xpi = (m
pi
x1
,mpix2 , . . . ,m
pi
xn
). He studied the set of all
convex combination of marginal contribution vectors, which is now called the
Weber Set, and showed that in convex games this set is also the set of all core
imputations in the game.
3 Cooperative Product Games
Cooperative Product Game, CPGs for short, are cooperative game where every
player has a weight, and the characteristic function is the product of the weights
of the players in the coalition.
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Definition 8. A CPG is a game over the player set P = (a1, . . . , an), where
every player ai has a weight wi ∈ R+. We define v(∅) = 0 and the value for
any other coalition C is:
v(C) =
∏
i∈C
wi
CPGs capture synergies between players in a simple way. Any player added
to a coalition multiplies its value by a certain factor, which depends on the
player.
In this work, I only look at games where the weight wi of any player ai is an
integer that is at least 2 (i.e. ∀iwi ≥ 2), so I first explain why this restriction
is needed. Using integer weights make the representation and simpler, and it is
easier to look at the computational complexity of algorithms. If an player ai has
a weight wi < 1, then adding it to a coalition actually lowers its value, because
it multiplies its value by a fraction. This makes the game non-monotonic. So
we want integer weights that are at least 1. But if a game has only two players
with weights that are both exactly one, the core is empty. To see this, consider
players 1, 2 with weights w1 = w2 = 0. Then we have v({a1}) = 1, v({a2}) = 1,
and v({a1, a2}) = 1. So, there is a total utility of 1 to divide, but both player 1
and player 2 need to get all of it for the core to be non-empty.
I show that when the weights in a CPG are at least 2, the game is monotonic
and that there are no dummy players.
Observation 1. CPGs are monotonic.
Proof. I first show that if you add an player to a coalition, its value increases.
This is certainly true for adding an player for the empty coalition ∅. Let C be a
coalition with at least one player. I know that v(C) ≥ 2 because all the weights
are at least 2, so the value is a product of many factors, each of which is at
least 2. Now consider adding a player ai /∈ C. Denote v(C) =
∏
i∈C wi = x. So
v(C ∪ {a}) = wi · x ≥ 2 · x ≥ x = v(C).
Observation 2. In a CPG, none of the players is a dummy player.
Proof. Let ai be a player in a CPG. By definition, wi ≥ 2. Consider the empty
coalition C = ∅. We have, by definition, v(C) = 0 and v(C ∪ {ai}) = wi ≥ 2, so
v(C ∪ {ai})  v(C).
3.1 Convexity And The Core Of CPGs
The goal of the core is to “solve” the game, and find reasonable divisions of
the total utility between the players. I first show that such distributions always
exist. I show this by showing that CPGs are convex.
Theorem 1. CPGs are convex games.
Proof. I need to show that for any two coalitions A,B ⊆ P we have v(A∪B) ≥
v(A) + v(B) − v(A ∩B).
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Consider two such coalitions A,B, and denote the intersection as X = A∩B.
If A = ∅ or B = ∅ then the requirements holds trivially. If X = ∅ then
v(A ∪B) =
∏
i∈A wi
∏
j∈B wj = v(A) · v(B) so we are done.
If X 6= ∅ then denote v(X) =
∏
i∈X wi = x. Denote A
′ = A \ X and
B′ = B \X , and denote a′ =
∏
i∈A′ wi and b
′ =
∏
j∈B′ wj .
Since all the weights are at least 2 we have x ≥ 2. Now, v(A) = v(A′ ∪X) =∏
i∈A′ wi
∏
x∈X wx = a
′ ·x and v(B) = v(B′ ∪X) =
∏
j∈B′ wj
∏
x∈X wx = b
′ ·x.
I have v(A∪B) = v(A′ ∪B′ ∪X) =
∏
i∈A′ wi
∏
j∈B′ wj
∏
x ∈ XwX = a′ · b′ ·x.
We also have v(A∩B) = v(X) = x. Thus v(A)+b(B)−v(A∩B) = a′ ·x+b′ ·
x−x, and v(A∪B) = a′ ·b′ ·x, so v(A∪B)−(v(A)+b(B)−v(A∩B)) = x ≥ 2 > 0
as required.
Theorem 2. Any CPG has a non-empty core.
Proof. I have shown the game is convex, and convex games are known to have
a non-empty core [94, 64].
I describe a method to find imputations in the core of a CPG, based on
permutations.
Theorem 3. It is possible to find a core imputation in a CPG in linear time.
Proof. Consider taking a permutation pi = (ax1 , ax2 , . . . , axn). The marginal
contribution of a player axi in this permutation is his contribution to the players
appearing before him in that permutation.
In CPGs the value of a coalition is the product of the weights of all the
coalition members, which makes it very simple to compute the marginal contri-
bution of any player in a permutation. We apply the definition of the value of a
coalition in a CPG and get the following formulas for the marginal contributions
of the players:
mpix1 = v({ax1}) = wx1
mpix2 = v({ax1 , ax2})− v({ax1}) = wx1 · wx2 − wx1 = wx1 · (wx2 − 1)
mpix3 = v({ax1 , ax2 , ax3})−v({ax1, ax2}) = wx1 ·wx2 ·wx3−(wx1 ·wx2) = (wx1 ·wx2)·(wx3−1)
. . .
mpixi = v({ax1 , . . . , axi})−v({ax1, . . . , axi−1}) = wx1 ·. . .·wxi−(wx1 ·wxi−1) = (wx1 ·. . .·wxi−1)·(wxi−1)
. . .
mpixn = v({ax1 , . . . , axn})−v({ax1, . . . , axn−1}) = wx1 ·. . .·wxn−(wx1 ·wxn−1) = (wx1 ·. . .·wxn−1)·(wxi−1)
To compute the marginal contributions above in a permutation, we simply
need to keep track of the product of all the weights until a current location, and
multiply by the next weight (and the next weight minus one).
Because CPGs are convex games (Theorem 1), and due to the result by
Weber [102] that in convex game any marginal contribution vector is a core
imputation, We get that the vector (mpix1 ,m
pi
x2
, . . . ,mpixn) is an imputation in the
core. Note that any permutation of the players and the above process would
result in a core imputation.
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4 Related Work
I used the cooperative game theory framework of transferable utility games.
Several books discuss cooperative game theory, and cover this and other frame-
works for player cooperation [82, 78, 87, 46, 48, 80].
Many solutions for cooperative games were proposed. The core was defined
by Gillies [61]. Others have proposed extensions and variants of the Core, like
the least-core [96] and the Nucleolus [92, 13]. Much work has also been done
on the relation between solving cooperative games and linear programming and
optimization [84, 45, 40, 39, 34, 30, 41, 29, 33, 22, 76]. Others defined values for
games, which as opposed to the core are a single imputation rather than a set of
imputations. These include the Shapley value [93, 95], the Banzhaf index [28],
the Deegan-Packel index [49] and many others [85, 52, 86, 103, 98, 91, 3, 77, 8].
One type of a cooperative game, based on weights, is weighted majority
games [68, 53, 99, 100, 75, 14]. In these games every player has a weight,
similarly to CPGs. However, weighted majority games have a quota, and the
value of a coalition is 1 if the sum of the player weights exceeds the quota and is
0 if it does not. Weighted majority games are a good model for voting in decision
making bodies, so they are sometimes called weighted voting games, and many
papers use game theoretic solution concepts to analyzing the power of players
in these games [95, 10, 74, 104, 42, 73, 6, 5, 15]. Because of this important
application, many researchers worked on computerized methods to calculate
solutions and power in weighted majority games and their complexity [83, 12,
88, 51, 75, 2, 7, 11, 20, 31, 55, 57]. Some research was also done on manipulations
that change solutions in weighted majority games [106, 97, 18, 109, 17, 72, 90].
CPGs are different from weighted majority games because they use the product
operator and not the sum operator, and do not have a quota. 1
Many other forms of ccoperative games were proposed in the past. Some
game forms are based on sets and set operations [35, 54, 56, 101, 60, 32, 24,
47, 16, 21]; Others forms rely on a logical representation and logical formulas
in various languages [65, 107, 63, 1, 105, 66]; Some models are bases on a
mathematical graph structures or an optimization problem in graphs [44, 79,
70, 51, 50, 108, 81, 89, 26, 25, 23, 62, 67]; There are also many other forms based
on other combinatorial structures [69, 37, 4, 59, 36, 38, 9]. Many researchers
also looked at the implications of cooperative game models to many fields, such
as energy, auctions voting and networks [71, 43, 19, 27, 58].
5 Conclusion
I showed an interesting type of cooperative game called CPG. In this game the
utility of a coalition is the product of the weights of the players in the coalition.
The key question I look at is how the players would agree to share the utility they
1It is possible to define a quota for CPGs similar to weighted majority games, so the value
of a coalition would be 1 if the product of the weights exceed this value and 0 otherwise, and
this is a very interesting game to study in the future.
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make together. To do this I used well-known solution concepts from cooperative
game theory.
I gave some results about convexity and the core of these games: all these
games never have dummy players, they are always convex and it is easy to
compute imputations in the core.
However, despite these results, many questions are still open about this kind
of game. What are the connections to weighted majority games? How is it
possible to calculate other solution concepts from game theory in this game,
such as the Shapley value or other indexes? Can this game be extended by
restricting the coalitions in some way or by adding a quota for the game?
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